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Abstract 
Modeling the Demand for Food Safety and the Implications for Regulation 
E. Kwan Choi and Helen H. Jensen 
The modern theory of demand which underlies much of economic analysis of 
consumer behavior is based on the premise that consumption goods are pure and 
do not involve risks. However, that is clearly not the case where concerns 
about food safety are involved. The awareness of linkages between consumption 
of foods and adverse health effects indicates the need for a new framework for 
investigating demand for food and food safety, and for guiding the appropriate 
government response to achieve optimal regulation of food safety levels. We 
develop such a framework and show that when safety is endogenous to the 
consumer's decision over a consumption bundle, perfect safety is not optimal. 
There are several implications of the model. Empirical analysis based on 
conventional demand theory may lack predictive power due to model 
misspecification and the unobserved survival probability function. 
Furthermore, if markets are perfectly competitive and consumers accurately 
informed about safety risk, there is no need for government regulation. 
However, when markets are not perfectly competitive, the answer is less clear-
cut. And, risk differentiation may become a new basis for acquiring and 
exercising market power. 
I. Introduction 
Modern demand theory is based on the premise that consumption goods are 
pure and do not involve risks. However, that is clearly not the case in 
Coday's world where reports from the scientific community link exposure from 
pesticide residue to increased cancer risk, intake of toxins or patho.gens to 
incidence of specific illness, and high levels of naturally occurring food 
components such as saturated food to inc.reased risk of heart disease. The 
awareness of such linkages suggests that a new framework is needed to 
investigate demand for food and food safety, and to guide the appropriate 
government response to achieve a socially optimal level of food safety. 
The news-breaking reports of hazards in a food appear to decrease the 
demand for the affected food. One example is the immediate decrease in fresh 
apple consumption in response to reports of alar residues in apples. w~ile it 
is tempting to attribute these shifts in demand to changes in tastes or 
preferences, modern demand theory is based on the assumption that consumption 
bundles are ranked by ordinal preferences and is incapable of analyzing 
consumer choices under risk. This paper attempts to answer questions on 
consumer response to food safety concerns by combining traditional demand 
theory and von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory. The framework 
developed provides a basis for constructing and interpreting empirical 
analyses and making public policies on food safety more effective. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we investigate demand for a 
risky consumption good and food safety. Since demand for safety cannot be 
derived from the conventional ordinal utility analysis, expected utility 
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analysis is employed to derive the demands for 11 quantity" and 1'safety. n The 
hazard in the risky good, food, is assumed to decrease the probability of 
survival. When safety is endogenous to the consumer's decision over a 
consumption bundle, we find that perfect safety is not optimal. Second, we 
consider plausible market organizations that may develop with or without 
government intervention and evaluate the implications of risk in food on 
approaches to regulation. We show that there is no need for government 
intervention to induce a socially optimal level of food safety if the market 
is perfectly competitive and consumers are accurately informed. The 
appropriate role of the government in this case is to verify producer claims 
on hazard content -not to regulate the level of food safety. When markets 
are not perfectly competitive, the answer is less clear-cut. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. First, we review the role 
of risk in the development of demand theory. Second, we consider the case 
where the hazard content of the risky good is assumed to be fixed. we derive 
the demand for a risky consumption good. In addition to the usual price and 
income variables, the impurity content of the risky good (or other measures of 
hazard) is shown to be an important determinant of demand for the risky good. 
Next, we examine the case where the consumer chooses not only the quantity of 
the risky good but also the level of hazard in the risky good. In this case, 
demands for food safety and quantity are jointly derived. The final section 
addresses implications for government regulation of food safety. 
II. Risk and Demand 
Two hundred years ago Jeremy Bentham (1789) - who laid the foundation of 
utility analysis - singled out certainty or uncertainty as a major factor in 
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assessing the utility of a commodity. Specifically, Bentham argued that "the 
pleasure or pain considered by itself, will be greater or less, according to 
its (i) intensity, (ii) duration, (iii) certainty or uncertainty, and (iv) 
propinquity or remoteness." Two other factors Bentham included for assessing 
the pleasure or pain from a consumption good are also caused by uncertainty: 
fecundity refers to the chance that the activity is followed by the same kind 
of pleasures or pains, while purity is the chance that the activity is not 
followed by sensations of the opposite kind. Economists have considered 
aspects of risk in consumption for some time. However, incorporating risk 
considerations in demand theory has not been a major concern to economists. 
Consequently, we still lack clear guidance from theory on how to incorporate 
uncertainty in the quality of goods in the theory of demand. 
Modern demand theory is based on the premise that consumption goods are 
pure or riskless. In 1892 Irving Fisher argued that there is no need to 
introduce cardinal utility to derive demand curves because the total utility 
function cannot in general be deduced from indifference curves. However, 
demand for risky consumption goods can only be derived from expected utility 
theory based on cardinal preferences. Bentham's early work on utility theory 
clearly indicates that risk is a major factor that should be taken into 
account when assessing (expected) utility from consuming "impure" or risky 
consumption goods. 
Risky consumption goods should be distinguished from the riskless or 
"pure" consumption goods in conventional demand theory. Pure consumption 
goods yield demand curves which can be derived from the conventional 
indifference curve analysis. In contrast, risky consumption goods not only 
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yield positive utility directly, but also have adverse side effects on the 
health or life expectancy. The consumer has to weigh the direct utility 
benefits and health risks of the risky consumption good. Accordingly, a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is employed to derive demand curves. 
This paper differs in two important respects from other contributions in 
the literature which allow quality differences. First, because food safety is 
an instance of the consumption decision made under uncertainty, demands for 
risky and riskless goods are derived from an expected utility analysis, rather 
than from the conventional ordinal utility analysis. Second, unlike quality 
characteristics which are discernible to the consumer upon inspection (e.g. 
Bockstael, Hanemann), the hazard levels in food are not discernible by visual 
inspection and do not generally have immediate side effects after consumption. 
Thus, the consumer is assumed here to be unable to discriminate among foods 
with different levels of hazard by visual inspection. Indeed, this is one of 
the more challenging problems of food safety policy. 
III. Demand for Food When There is Fixed Hazard 
The traditional models of demand consider only "pure" goods whose demands 
can be derived from ordinal preferences. In contrast, we assume that the food 
contains a hazard such as a toxin or pathogen. The hazard is embodied in the 
risky good and cannot economically be separated by the consumer. We begin 
with the case where the level of hazard in food is exogenous and cannot be 
controlled by the consumer. This does not mean that the consumer is not 
concerned with food safety but that he or she cannot choose different levels 
of food safety in selecting the bundle of consumption goods. The selection is 
only over different levels of the risky good. 
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For simplicity, we assume that all firms are identical and produce a 
homogeneous risky good X. The toxin is tasteless and cannot be detected 
during consumption and hence does not affect utility in the current period. 
The absorbed toxin, however, affects the "health 11 of the consumer in the next 
period. Although the hazard is undetectable during consumption, we assume 
that it can be measured objectively and that the consumer is informed about 
its hazard content. Note, we are not addressing the issue of information 
here. 
Extensions of the Demand Model 
We consider an individual who lives for two periods with time-invariant 
utility functions over two goods: a risky food X and another (numeraire) good 
Z, which is a composite good including all nonfood commodities with price of 
unity. The probability of survival is assumed to be less than one and the 
consumer faces uncertainty regarding survival into the next period. Note that 
the term "survival'' is used in a broad sense. Survival could be interpreted 
as the state of good health and nonsurvival the state of poor health. While 
survival is uncertain, the probability of survival is known and 
deterministically linked to the quantity of the risky food consumed. 
Specifically, the consumer is assumed to know the probability of survival 
which is affected by the quantity of the risky commodity consumed. 
If the individual survives into the next pe,iod, his preferences in each 
period can be represented by a monotone increasing and concave von Naumann-
Morgenstern utility function 
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where X, and z, are the quantities of the risky good and the riskless 
composite good consumed in period i, respectively. The budget constraint in 
each period is given by 
where p, is the price of the risky good in period i, and the price of the 
composite good is unity in both periods. 
Let ~ be the probability of survival, 0 ~ ~ < 1. If the individual 
survives, the consumer maximizes u(X2 ,Z2 ) subject to the budget constraint in 
the second period. Let X(p2 ,I2 ) and Z(p2 ,I2 ) denote the second period demand 
functions. The indirect utility in the second period is, 
If the individual does not survive, he receives no income. Without loss 
of generality, it can be assumed that the utility level in the second period 
is zero if the individual fails to survive (u2 - 0). Assume further that the 
utility function in each period is normalized so that the utility in the 
second period when the individual survives is unity, i.e., v- 1. Then the 
second period utility can be written as a random variable, 
0, with probability (1- ~). 
1, with probability ~. 
The expected utility of the consumer for both periods is 
J - u(X,Z) + 1f6, 
where & is a discount factor, 0 < 5 $ 1. 
(1) 
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Now, let a denote the amount of impurity per unit of the risky good X 
consumed. Then the total amount of impurity absorbed, C, is 
C - aX. (2) 
For simplicity, the hazard content is normalized so that 0 ~a~ l. Then~ s 
1 · a is a measure of safety because an increase in ~ indicates increased 
safety. The probability of survival is assumed to be a function of the 
impurity absorbed: 
" - ~r[ (1-~)X], (3) 
This survival probability function captures Bentham's notion of the risk or 
impurity in the consumption good, and is assumed to have the properties that 
tr' (C) < 0 for C > 0 and 1r' (0) - 0. That is, the known probability of survival 
reaches its maximum at C - 0 when there is no impurity, and decreases as the 
amount of impurity absorbed through the risky good increases. 
The specification of the survival probability function is important to the 
determination of the optimal amount of the risky good X consumed. If the 
survival probability function is strictly concave in the hazard (~r" < 0), then 
the probability of survival increases at a decreasing rate as ~ increases. On 
the other hand, if 1r(C) is convex in C, then the probability of survival 
increases at· an increasing rate as p increases. Since the individual lives 
only two periods, the probability of survival becomes a determinant of demand 
for the risky good in the first period, but not in the terminal period. 
To facilitate the analysis in the next section we substitute Z - I · pX in 
the utility function. The objective function (1) can be rewritten 
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J • u(X,I - pX) + S~[(l-~)X]. (4) 
Assume that the price of the risky good p is not prohibitive so that the 
expected utility in (4) is increasing in X at X- 0. 1 The first order 
condition for an interior solution (X > 0) is 
Jx • ux - puz + ~- (C)(l-~lS - o. (5) 
Solving (5) yields the demand functions, 
X- X(p,I;~,S), Z- Z(p,I;~,S). (6) 
This result implies that when the level of hazard is fixed demand functions 
are affected by food safety, as well as by prices and income. 2 
Food Safety and the Demand for the Riskv Food 
We now investigate the effect of a change in hazard content on the demand 
for the risky good. An increase in food safety or a decrease in hazard 
content will increase the probability of survival. Since the consumer cannot 
differentiate goods with different levels of hazard by visual inspection, 
products are assumed to carry labels with hazard content to enable an informed 
consumption decision. We assume that the consumer is fully informed about the 
hazard content, i.e., product labels are truthful, false labeling and 
advertising are ruled out, and the consumer understands the information being 
conveyed (National Research Council 1989). 
How does a decrease in the level of hazard a affect the demand for the 
risky good? Differentiating (5) with respect to ~ gives 
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where Jxx is negative by the second order condition, and 
JXp - - 5• (1r' + (l-p)X1r"). (7) 
If the probability function is concave (1r" < 0), then oX/of! > 0. In this 
case, increased safety increases demand for X. However, the sign of oX/3fJ is 
indeterminate if 1r 11 > 0. 
How does the probability of survival change in response to an increase in 
impurity content a? This is a relevant question for public regulators. 
Differentiating 1r(aX) with respect to a gives 
81rj8a- ,., (X+ a(3X/Ba))- 1r'X(l- 8), (8) 
where 8 • -(ax;aa)(a/X) is the risk elasticity of demand for X. The total 
amount of impurity absorbed, aX, increases, remains constant or decreases 
according to whether the risk elasticity of demand for X is less than, equal 
to, or greater than unity. For example, if the demand for X is risk inelastic 
(8 < 1), then an increase in the impurity content of X increases the total 
amount of impurity absorbed aX and hence reduces the probability of survival. 
On the other hand, if demand for X is risk elastic (8 > l) , an increase in a 
reduces the total impurity absorbed and increases the probability of survival. 
Note that 8 represents the consumer's ranking of safety for product X and may 
differ among products. 
IV. Demand for Food Safety 
In the preceding section we considered demand for food when riskiness of 
food is exogenous and food safety could not be controlled by the consumer. In 
this section we relax this assumption and derive demand for food safety. It 
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is important to note that food safety is not an independent good, separate 
from the demand for food. Thus, we investigate how demand for food safety and 
demand for quantity are jointly determined in the consumption decision. We 
assume that the price of food p(a) consumers have to pay depends on how risky 
the consumption good is. This is the case since, in general, it is costly to 
increase food safety for given quantity of food, and hence the total price the 
consumer pays also depends on food safety. 
Let p(~) be the price of X with impurity level a- 1 - ~- In general, 
removal of an impurity from food raises production costs, and thus p(~) is 
assumed to increase as~ increases. For simplicity, we assume a linear price 
schedule, p(~) - p0 + q~, where q is the price of safety, i.e., the price the 
consumer has to pay to eliminate impurity. The budget constraint is: I - (p 0 
+ q~)X - Z - 0. 
The consumer's problem is to choose X and~ to maximize utility 
J • u(X, I - (p 0 + ~)X] + 6"(aX). (9) 
The first order conditions for maximum utility are 
(lOa) 
(lOb) 
Thus, demands for X and safety~ can be written 
X- X(p0 ,q,6,I), ~ - a ( p0 , q, 6 , I) . 
Demands for X and ~ now depend on the prices of "quantity" and "safety", as 
well as income and the discount factor 6. Note also that the perfect safety 
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situation CP = 1) is a corner solution. Under suitable conditions an interior 
solution to (lOa) and (lOb) exists. Thus, in general the optimal safety level 
~ is positive and less than unity for all p0 • It can also be shown that an 
increase in p or q has an ambiguous effect on demands for X and~-
Quantity versus Safety Choice 
In order to evaluate the consumer's tradeoff between quantity and safety 
when safety is endogenous, we consider the effects of changing own prices on 
demands. A change in the price of quantity or safety affects the amount of 
money allocated to the numeraire good, and this response of the numeraire good 
obscures many comparative static results. Specifically, a change in a 
parameter not only affects demands for X and ~ for a given budget allocated to 
the risky consumption good, but also affects them indirectly through an 
adjustment in the total expenditure on the risky good. Thus, the total effect 
is the sum of the direct effect and the indirect effect through the adjustment 
in the budget allocated for the risky good. 
Algebraically, the slopes of demand curves are given by 
ax;apo- (ax;ap0 )1s + (ax;aB)(dB/dp 0 ), (lla) 
a~;aq- <a~;aqlls + (a~;as)(dB/dq), (llbl 
where B is the budget allocated to be spent on the risky good X. In (lla) and 
(llb) the first terms are direct effects and the second terms are the budget 
effects. If X and~ are normal goods, then ax;as > 0 and a~;as > 0. 
The choice problem can thus be decomposed into two stages. In the second 
stage we consider how changes in the prices of the risky good, p0 , and of food 
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safety, q, affect the choice of quantity and safety. The second stage ignores 
the budget effect of changes in the prices of quantity and safety. This 
restriction allows us to focus sharply on the direct effects of changes in the 
prices on the demands for quantity and safety. 
In the first stage, income is allocated between B and Z, and the 
expenditure is subject to the budget constraint, B + Z- I. As shown in (lla) 
and (llb), a change in p 0 or q has indirect effects on X and fi via the change 
in the budget allocation B to the risky good. Unlike in the conventional 
demand theory, the budget curve is convex to the origin. Thus, it is quite 
possible for safety to be a Giffen good. An increase in q could lead to an 
increase in the level of safety demanded. Alternatively, for a given price of 
safety, a decrease in the quantity price, p 0 , could decrease the amount of X 
consumed. Thus, economists need not be alarmed if estimated ~emand systems 
reveal that food safety is a Giffen good. 
V. Implications for Regulation of Food Safety 
When the food industry produces a potentially hazardous food, the 
government may regulate its activity in three directions. First, the 
government may regulate how information about risk characteristics of products 
are produced and disseminated to consumers. Second, it can regulate the 
industry output directly in order to reduce hazards to the public. Third, it 
can regulate the level of food safety. 
Regulation of Information 
On the supply side, resources are used up in reducing the hazard content 
or in increasing food safety. Information about the hazard content is also 
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costly to produce, and to disseminate to consumers. Thus, it is necessary ~o 
consider aspects of the market and market structure in order to evaluate the 
implications of risk and hazard on the demand for food, and on the socially 
optimal level of hazard. There are many firms in the food processing 
industry. Although a monopoly structure is not likely to emerge, some degree 
of market power may exist, for example, due to advertising or the technology 
of processing (Connor et al. 1985). 
Monopolistic competition or differentiated oligopoly could develop in the 
food processing industry in part because producers can differentiate their 
products in terms of hazard content or health improving characteristics. In 
the traditional theory of monopolistic competition, firms differentiate their 
products in terms of easily identifiable characteristics, such as color, 
weight, horsepower, etc. Consumers can easily discriminate these different 
products by visual inspection. In contrast, if the firms in the food 
processing industry differentiate products by risk or hazard content, and the 
level of hazard is not verifiable by visual inspection, producers must provide 
information about the hazard level in order to differentiate effectively. 
Accurate information about risk characteristics of products is also necessary 
for optimal consumption decisions. 
The need for information on hazard content, however, poses a regulation 
problem. In the absence of government intervention, producers have no 
incentive to report the hazard content truthfully since that may depress 
demand for their products. This problem can be resolved if a producer group 
voluntarily organizes or uses an existing marketing board or producer union to 
monitor the hazard content of their products. The objective would be to 
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increase demand for the hazardous good by encouraging consumers to 
discriminate the producer group's products from those of nonparticipating 
producers with potentially higher levels of hazard. Even in this case, the 
producer group may be unlikely to reveal information about hazards common to 
all products in the industry because such negative information would depress 
the demand for the industry products. 
A consumer group could also monitor product testing to protect consumers 
by providing more accurate product information. However, it is difficult to 
organize consumer groups. A more practical solution is government regulation 
of the information. With enough resources, the government could either 
directly test products and collect and disseminate information about risk 
characteristics, or induce producers to disseminate accurate information by 
random sampling or testing. 
The role of government may not be limited to insuring that producers 
provide consumers with accurate information about hazard content. It may also 
be necessary to regulate how products are differentiated by risks. Even if 
each producer provides a product label indicating the correct hazard content, 
each producer may choose a different level of risk. With this approach, 
however, infinite product differentiation by risks raises the cost of 
processing information to consumers. Grading (treatment with pesticide, 
product inspection, etc.) or product standardization would reduce the cost of 
processing information. For many produc,s, only a few levels of hazard could 
be chosen for practical reasons; if consumers are diverse in their tastes, 
several levels of food safety could be specified, depending on whether 
consumer groups could be easily separated by their socioeconomic 
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characteristics. For instance, only two categories such as low salt and 
regular products, or diet and regular beverage, etc. may be allowed. The 
government may specify a maximum allowable hazard level within a regulated 
category. If the government regulates the hazard content by allowing only a 
few categories, it becomes difficult for producers to differentiate their 
products by risks. In this case, producers might be forced to behave as 
competitive firms. Producers may remain monopolistically competitive or 
oligopolistic if they can compete by other means. 
Regulation of Quantity and Safety 
If the government regulates producers to disseminate accurate information 
about risk characteristics of products, will producers supply the socially 
optimal levels of food quantity and safety? Or is there a need for the 
government to regulate the optimal levels of quantity or safety? For 
simplicity, we consider optimal level of safety for the representative 
consumer in a well defined consumer group. All producers are assumed to be 
identical. Consider a representative firm producing a "hazardous 11 product. 
The firm's profit is 
~- (p0 + qfi)X- C(X,fi). (12) 
The first order conditions are 
a~;ax- (p0 + qfi) - ex- o. (13a) 
a~;afi - qx - cfi - o. (13b) 
In the absence of government intervention, the intersection of the supply 
16 
and demand curves determine the optimal level of safety. The socially optimal 
level of hazard, which is not necessarily zero, is obtained by solving the 
utility maximization problem of a represent·ative consumer who also receives 
profit from production. That is, if the consumer is also a producer, he will 
choose the optimal levels of output and hazard. Policy makers can utilize 
this information to set the socially optimal food safety standard. 
If the representative consumer were to produce the risky good and safety 
himself, he would choose the levels of X and~ where marginal benefits are 
equal to marginal costs. Equations (l3a) and (l3b) indicate that the 
representative consumer would produce the same levels of X and ~ as produced 
by competitive firms. This is because the consumer equates the marginal 
benefit of each good to its price and the competitive firm equates marginal 
cost to the price. This condition holds for both the tangible good X and the 
intangible good ~ called safety. Thus, when the supply and demand for each 
good clears, the marginal benefit is also equal to marginal cost. 
The Structure of Market and Regulation 
The above reasoning implies that there is no need for the government to 
regulate the level of safety. The desired level of safety the policy maker 
chooses is exactly the level chosen by producers and consumers. Insofar as 
the product labels deliver accurate information in language transparent to 
consumers, there is no need for active government intervention. The role of 
government should be limited co verifying the producer claims about the hazard 
content, and not on the levels of food safety or output when the market is 
perfectly competitive. Regulation of the levels of food safety below or above 
the free market level would result in a welfare loss. 3 
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This result also holds when there are many consumer groups which choose 
different le-rels of food safety; each consumer group and the corresponding 
producer group will jointly choose an optimal level of food safety in each 
product category. If products are supplied by a differentiated oligopoly, a 
case can be made for government regulation of both quantity and safety. 
However, when the market is imperfectly competitive, partial regulation of 
output will guarantee neither the optimal level of food safety nor the optimal 
level of the quantity of the risky good. 
Since it is costly to lower the toxin level and consumers have difficulty 
discriminating products with different levels of hazard, a perfectly 
competitive firm has no incentive to reduce the toxin level. Monopolistically 
competitive food suppliers could differentiate the toxin levels in food, but 
consumers bear the high information cost of search or advertisement to find 
goods with the "desired" toxin level. Consumers are not likely to bear high 
information cost when there is a monopolistic food supplier. However, there 
is no incentive for the monopolist to produce either the level of output or of 
hazard which is socially optimal. 
In sum, what are the implications of having "hazard" in a food from the 
perspective of the market and for regulation? In the absence of government 
intervention, perfectly competitive firms do not have an incentive to provide 
safe products if there is a cost involved in reducing the hazard and if 
consumers cannot discern the hazard. If consumers are able to discern the 
hazard or if consumers are perfectly informed, there is no need for gove·rnment 
regulation. Thus, when the market is perfectly competitive, the primary role 
for the government or a marketi~g group would be to verify the accuracy of the 
information provided. 
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If the market is not competitive and firms engage in product 
differentiation by other means, then the market solution will not generally be 
optimal. In an imperfectly competitive market, output occurs at a point where 
price exceeds marginal cost. Thus, if the food processing industry producing 
a potentially hazardous good is not competitive, the industry output will not 
be socially optimal. Moreover, willingness to pay for safety may also exceed 
marginal cost of safety. In this case, it may be necessary for the government 
to regulate both quantity and safety levels. Regulating only the quantity on 
the supply side will not generally guarantee the optimal level of food safety. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Modern demand theory is based on the premise that consumption goods are 
pure and do not involve risks. In this paper we investigate demand for risky 
goods. The risky g~ood increases utility in the current period, but hazard in 
the risky good decreases the probability of survival for the consumer. Since 
individuals cannot detect the hazard themselves, the information on the hazard 
content is disseminated by producers. A von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function is used to derive demand functions for the quantity and the safety 
level. We have argued that there is no need for government regulation to 
achieve a socially optimal level of food safety if the market is perfectly 
competitive. Government efforts may be best directed to verification and 
communication of hazard information to consumers so that they can make well 
informed consumption decisions. 
The challenges and problems implied for empirical research and for 
appropriate government response are many. Although our list is not 
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exhaustive, we would like to highlight a few. First, the implication for 
demand theory when the risks of consumption are taken into account is that the 
probability of survival - which represents ·the individual's physiological 
response to the hazard - affects the usual price and income elasticities for 
demand for the risky consumption good X. As such, traditional demand 
parameters are not sufficient to capture consumer response to changes in 
risks. For some hazards, the "bias" may be quite large. 
A major problem for empirical analysis of demand when there is risk is the 
lack of predictive power of conventional demand theory. Estimated demand 
equations using price and income as explanatory variables are misspecified. 
This may be particularly true when demand for safety is endogenously 
determined. Moreover, economists need not be alarmed even if estimated demand 
equations reveal that quantity or safety is a Giffen good. Validating the 
consumer demand under these circumstances requires significant knowledge about 
the properties of the survival probability function. For example, imposing 
restrictions such as adding up and homogeneity on estimated equations will 
require extreme caution since demand functions are not derived from ordinal 
preferences. 
We have assumed that information can be provided to consumers directly. 
Insight about risk communication (National Research Council 1989) indicates 
that this may not be the case. A consumer may have a subjective belief about 
the hazard content of the risky good. Even if accurate information about the 
hazard is transmitted, the consumer belief may be sticky and slow to adjust to 
new transmissions. Thus-, results of empirical demand studies need to be 
conditioned on how accurately consumers receive information and how fast they 
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revise their subjective beliefs. While not underestimating the difficulty of 
information transmission, we have tried to identify issues directly related to 
the "modern demand theory," as it is no longer capable of analyzing demands 
for risky consumption goods. 
Finally, we argue that market structure and firm behavior become important 
considerations of government response to food safety issues. Although we have 
shown that government regulation on the level of food safety is redundant when 
the markets are competitive, government response would be different when 
products are differentiated or firms hold some degree of market power. In 
general, both heterogeneous oligopoly and monopolistic competition are market 
structures which exist in the food industry (Connor et al. 1985). For 
relatively unprocessed agricultural commodities (meat, eggs, fresh fruits and 
vegetables) we may be safe in applying the model of perfect competition. For 
other food products, such as processed products, public policy will need to 
address the issues of regulating firms which engage in risk differentiation 
(product differentiation by risk or safety) because it is a new basis for 
acquiring and exercising market power. 
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Endnotes 
1. This assumption is made because even if there is risk an individual has to 
consume some amount of food to survive into the second period. 
2. The general expression of the expected utility is u(X1 ,Z1 ) + o[~u(X2 ,Z2 ) + 
(1-~)u(O,O)]. Since the total utility is a weighted sum of von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions, a positive linear transformation~(·) -au+ b,-
a> 0, of both u(X1 ,Z1) and u(X2 ,Z2), will affect the demand for the risky 
good. However, for a given K, a monotonic transformation of J(X1 ,Z1 ,X2 ,Z2 ) 
u(X1 ,Z1 ) + o~u(X2 ,Z2 ) does not distort the marginal rate of substitution 
between current and future consumption goods, and hence does not affect the 
demand for the risky good. To see this, let¢- ¢(J), with¢' > 0. The first 
order condition reduces to ¢'(J)JX- 0, or JX- 0. However, a change in the 
probability of survival affects the intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution. 
3. In a different context Bockstael also argues that minimum quality 
standards lead to social losses. 
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